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African politics are often said to be dominated by ethnic divides, with the ensuing policies im-
plemented by leaders being based almost exclusively on their ethnic power base. In this paper, we
demonstrate that the village of origin of democratically-elected leaders matters for the attribution
of development projects in the context of one of the largest Community-Driven Development (CDD)
programs in Senegal. After showing that leadership matters, we consider those factors that deter-
mine who is elected president (and vice-president) of a Conseil rural, the smallest administrative unit
in Senegal. We also consider the link between power in the Conseil rural and that in the Conseil
de Concertation et de Gestion (CCG), an assembly coopted by the Conseil rural president that is
typical of local institutions set up in the context of CDD programs, and which is responsible for
the participative identiﬁcation of the development projects that constitute the priorities of villagers.
Using a unique dataset, we show that ethnicity plays almost no role in determining who becomes
president (or vice-president) of a Conseil rural, while party politics, age, political experience, village
loyalty, and educational and professional qualiﬁcations do. Our ﬁndings highlight the crucial im-
portance, in terms of development policy, of the local political institutions that are often reinforced
or created alongside CDD programs.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
What determines the choice of local political leaders in Africa, within the context of
nominally democratic institutions? And does the identity of these leaders matter in terms
of development policy, particularly with respect to the attribution of projects that are the
bread and butter of Community-Driven Development (CDD) programs?1 Using a unique
dataset stemming from an important CDD program in Senegal, this paper attempts to
shed light on these two important questions. In particular, we show that the village
of origin of democratically-elected leaders at the local level is a signiﬁcant determinant
of which villages get projects and which do not, and that leaders are chosen largely on
the basis of geographical loyalties, party politics and various individual characteristics,
though not on account of their ethnicity.
There is a widespread belief in the economics profession that ethnicity is the root
of many evils in Africa, as crystallized in the inﬂuential paper by Easterly and Levine
(1997).2 But what about party politics? Contrary to economists, political scientists
working on Africa have focused not only on ethnicity but on democratic politics as well.3
Indeed, Smith (2000) notes that:
Perhaps the two most prominent issues of interest in political studies of
Africa in the past decade have been ethnicity and democracy. The spectre
of ethnic conﬂict so prominent in popular press accounts of Africa has been
balanced to some extent by an academic interest in issues of democratisation.
One of the purposes of this paper is to provide an empirical assessment, at least
for the Senegalese case, of what actually matters in terms of policy choices taken at the
grassroots level. Moreover, given the recent interest in the empirical impact of leadership
on economic growth at the cross-national level (Jones and Olken 2005), it would seem
useful to carry out similar analyses at the local level.
Our paper also contributes to a growing body of literature dealing with decentralized
development. Key references include work by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000, 2005,
1On Community-Driven and Community-Based Development (CDD/CBD) programs, see the excellent survey by
Mansuri and Rao (2004).
2See also Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) on the US.
3Note, however, that political scientists are not immune to this criticism: Hyden (1994) refers to the electoral system as
often being forgotten in analyses of policymaking in Africa. See Cowen and Laakso (1997) and Golder and Wantchekon
(2004) for thorough overviews of electoral studies in Africa.
22006a, 2006b), Foster and Rosenzweig (2004), Besley and Burgess (2001, 2002), and
Besley and Coate (2003). In contrast to this corpus of work, which is essentially inspired
by the Indian experience, our paper provides rare microeconometric evidence in an African
context. In terms of its empirical strategy, our work follows in the footsteps of Besley,
Pande, Rahman, and Rao (2004) on the allocation of public goods in India, although
we go beyond the determinants of the allocation of funds and focus additionally on the
determinants of leadership. As with Besley, Pande, Rahman, and Rao (2004), our
paper can also be seen as a test of the Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) model of
universalistic overspending versus agenda setting models in the tradition of Romer and
Rosenthal (1978) or Baron (1993).
While the impact of political representation on the distribution of government spending
has been extensively documented in the developed world (Atlas, Gilligan, Hendershott
and Zupan 1995, Lee 1998, 2000, Ansolabehere, Gerber and Snyder 2002, Rodden 2002,
Horiuchi and Saito 2003) and in some middle-income countries (Gibson, Calvo and Falleti,
2004), we know of no evidence on this topic at the local level in Africa. Moreover, the
additional value-added that we bring is that our data allow us to study the determinants
of political leadership per se, and to disentangle the various characteristics that determine
who is a democratically-elected leader and who is not.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In part 2, we provide a concise summary of
local politics in Senegal and the role played by sub-regional political institutions in terms
of the allocation of CDD funds to individual villages. Next we show, for the case of one of
the major CDD project in Senegal –the Programme National d’Infrastructures Rurales
(PNIR)– that (i) village representation at the local government level and (ii) the identity
(village origin) of leaders matter in terms of who gets funds and who does not. Having
established that leadership is one of the main determinants of the allocation of funds,
part 3 then turns to uncovering the determinants of leadership, with a particular focus on
whether ethnic concerns are empirically important. Having demonstrated that Conseil
rural presidencies and vice-presidencies are won on the basis of party politics, political
experience, geographical loyalty, educational attainment and professional aﬃliation, but
not on the basis of ethnicity, we then consider the determinants of Comité de concertation
et de gestion (CCG) committee presidencies, since the CCG is the coopted body that
3identiﬁes eligible village-level projects through a participative process and thus has a
major agenda-setting role in terms of the attribution of CDD funds. Part 5 concludes by
oﬀering some thoughts on lines for further research on local democratic politics in Africa,
and its interaction with decentralized development programs.
2 Local politics and community-driven development in Senegal
2.1 Political decentralization in Senegal
Political decentralization has been an ongoing process in Senegal since the early 1990s
(Vengroﬀ and Johnston 1987, 1989, Ndoye, Ibrahima and Philippe 1994), which came
to full fruition with the 1996 local elections. At the local level, the key institution is
constituted by the Conseil rural, a body whose members are elected by universal suﬀrage
for a ﬁve year mandate and that operates at the level of the smallest administrative unit
in Senegal, the Communauté rurale (henceforth, CR).4 Each CR,o fw h i c ht h e r ea r e3 2 0
in the country, takes in 40 villages on average. The Conseil rural is composed of 20, 24,
28 or 32 members, depending upon whether the population of the associated CR is less
than 5,000, between 5,000 and 10,000, between 10,000 and 15,000 or more than 15,000
inhabitants, respectively.5 The median size of the Conseil ruraux considered in this
paper is 32 members.
While Senegal has sometimes been dubbed a "semi-democracy" (Beck 1997), it is
clear that the Conseil rural constitutes a vibrant expression of party politics at the local
level. The 1996 local elections, as described by Vengroﬀ and Ndiaye (1998), were ﬁercely
contested and, despite some interference by the ruling Socialist Party of President Abdou
Diouf, were largely seen as free and fair.
The Conseil ruraux have limited powers of taxation, with the lion’s share of their
resources coming from transfers from the central government.6 At the local level, their
main sources of revenues are the taxe rurale (a poll tax), as well as licenses, patentes,
land and real estate taxes.7 According to the Local Community Code (Code des collec-
tivités locales), the Conseil rural is responsible for the allocation of all land in the CR
4Article 290 of the Electoral Code. For a full description of the functioning of the Conseil rural, the reader is referred
to Sénégal (1998).
5Article 285 of the Electoral Code.
6These transfers are essentially earmarked for investment purposes (as opposed to consumption expenditures), as codiﬁed
in the administrative documents describing the Fonds de dotation de la décentralisation (Art. 58 of L. 96-07).
7Article 251 of the Local Community Code.
4(though traditional Chefs de terre often play an important role), and shoulders a share of
responsabilities concerning environmental, educational, health, cultural, and urbanistic
issues.
The key actors in the Conseil rural are its president and vice-presidents (of which
there are often two), elected by a simple majority of members. The president is es-
sentially in charge of all of the Conseil rural’s workings, including procedural matters
and the timing of meetings. His responsibility for the Conseil rural’s budget (under the
supervision of the sous-préfet) and his twin roles both as the representative of the CR
and the state’s representative at the local level confer undoubted agenda-setting power
on the oﬃce. Decisions in the Conseil rural are taken by a simple majority of those
representatives present at meetings, as long as a quorum of 50% of members present is
satisﬁed. An indication of the explicit institutional wish, embodied in the Conseil rural,
to run counter to traditional power structures in rural Senegal is that village chiefs can be
neither president nor vice-president.8 In some sense, this "negative reservation" policy
(to paraphrase the Indian terminology) provides us with an interesting natural experi-
ment in which individual preferences can be revealed in a manner that is legislatively
divorced from choices that might be made on the basis of traditional social norms.
2.2 Political institutions created by CDD
The CDD program considered in this paper is the Programme National d’Infrastructures
Rurales ( h e n c e f o r t hP N I R ) ,f u n d e db yt h eW o r l dB a n ka n dI F A D ,w h i c ho p e r a t e di n9 0
of the poorest CRs in Senegal. Eligible project types included health, educational and
sanitary facilities, potable water and access roads. The ﬁrst phase of the program, which
is the focus of our empirical work, started delivering completed projects in 2002 and ran
until 2005. The total budget for the ﬁrst phase of the PNIR was approximately $42
million.
Within the operational structure of the PNIR, the Conseil rural, and especially its
president, played a key role. This is because one of the aims of the PNIR, through its local
investment fund, was to transfer ﬁnancial resources to the CRs. Though PNIR activites
were overseen in Dakar by a national coordination unit and then, at the regional level,
by eight Bureaux régionaux de coordination, operational responsibility lay entirely with
8Article 203 of the Local Community Code.
5the CRs,w h ow e r ec h a r g e dw i t ho v e r s e e i n ga n di m p l e m e n t i n gc o m m u n i t ym i c r o p r o j e c t s ,
and preparing both a local development plan (Plan local de développement –PLD)a n d
a consolidated annual investment plan (Plan annuel d’investissement –PAI ). These
were then transformed into a concrete request for local investment fund ﬁnancing.9 An
interesting aspect of the ﬁrst phase of the PNIR was that each CR was assisted by a
facilitator (often in the form of an NGO or a local consultant), funded by the PNIR
on an annual basis, and charged with assisting the Conseil rural in terms of planning,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation.
A feature of CDD programs is that they often create an additional tier of local insti-
tutions geared towards allocating funds between diﬀerent uses and diﬀerent communities
in the administrative units that fall under their purview. These institutions are also
meant to increase the "voice" of groups viewed as being under-represented in local polit-
ical institutions. In this respect, the ﬁrst phase of the PNIR was no exception in that a
functioning Conseil de concertation et de gestion (henceforth, CCG)w a sasine qua non
for villages in a PNIR-eligible CR to be able to access funds.10
Designed to ensure the representation of vulnerable/marginalized groups that might
n o tm a k ei to n t ot h eConseil rural through the electoral process (the young, women,
speciﬁc castes), through their cooptation by the Conseil rural president (who is also de
jure the CCG president), the CCG was responsible for the participative identiﬁcation of
projects to be funded by the PNIR. Its composition was in part determined on the basis of
a diagnostic process, designed to enhance the participation by the potential beneﬁciaries,
and implemented by the Conseil rural with the assistance of the facilitator alluded to
above.
The CCG approved the CR’s annual investment plan, reviewed the implementation
progress of microprojects, mobilized the contributions of the CR and the local commu-
nities, and ensured the transparency of procurement and ﬁnancial management. The
median size of the CCGs in our dataset is 27 members. Its main internal body was
the Bureau,w h i c hc o m p r i s e d ,i na d d i t i o nt ot h eConseil rural president, a secretary,
an assistant secretary, and ﬁve commission presidents (with responsabilities for (i) local
investment fund projects, (ii) rural roads, (iii) procurement, (iv) training and communi-
9For a summary of operational procedures, see PNIR (2001a), which is available from the authors upon request.
10A description of the functioning of the CCG is provided by PNIR (2001b), also available from the authors upon request.
6cation, and (v) income-generating activites, respectively). In terms of the allocation of
PNIR projects the CCG played an essential role in that it received project proposals, de-
termined whether the proposals respected the criteria for eligibility, and either accepted
or rejected the proposals. When the CCG accepted a proposal, it was then included in
the annual investment plan and local development plans which were in turn transmitted
to the Conseil rural, which adopted them by a simple majority vote. These were then
transmitted to the PNIR’s Bureaux régionaux de coordination which were responsible for
disbursements.
The upshot of administrative decentralization in Senegal in terms of CDD is that the
identity of Conseil rural presidents and vice-presidents, as well as village representation
both on the Conseil rural a n do nt h ec o r r e s po n d i n gCCG are likely to be key determinants
of the allocation of PNIR funds among the diﬀerent villages in a given CR. The outcome
of the interaction of local political structures and the PNIR is therefore likely to be an
essential ingredient in terms of the success or failure of CDD-based development in rural
Senegal.
2.3 Who gets projects?
While the main topic of this paper –what determines who gets to be a Conseil rural
president or vice-president– is interesting in and of itself from the political economy
perspective, the issue is also important from the operational standpoint in the context of
CDD, where local political institutions, as shown above for the case of Senegal, play an
important role in determining the pattern of attribution of development funds. If the
identity of political leaders matters in terms of the attribution of these funds, then the
analysis of the determinants of leadership becomes an essential factor in any analysis of
decentralized development policy. Before doing so, it is therefore of some importance to
consider whether leadership is a statistically signiﬁcant determinant of the allocation of
CDD funds.
In order to organize our thoughts and provide a theoretical basis for the ﬁrst portion
of our empirical work, we consider a simple adaptation of Dixit and Londregan (1996) to
the Conseil rural context. We assume that the purpose of the Conseil rural president
is to maximize his expected level of support within the Conseil rural by allocating (i)
7PNIR funds and (ii) seats on the CCG to various villages.
In conformity with the administrative process set up by the PNIR, we consider a
sequential decisionmaking process in which the Conseil rural president ﬁrst allocates seats
on the CCG, and then proposes budgetary allocations. We will refer to the allocation of
seats on the CCG as the period 1 decisionmaking problem, while the choice of budgetary
allocations, given the distribution of seats on the CCG, will be referred to as the period
2 problem. Given the sequential nature of this process, we solve the model by backward
induction.
Assume that the Conseil rural president from CR c can propose the allocation gvc to
village v =1 ,...,V within CR c =1 ,...,C. The total allocation of funds within the CR
must satisfy the budget constraint:
v=V X
v=1
gvc = Gc, (1)
where Gc represents the total budget for PNIR projects within CR c. This corresponds to
the functioning of the PNIR, as well as many other CDD programs, in which budgets are
often ﬁxed at the sub-regional level on a per capita basis. A Conseil rural representative
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where xvc represents characteristics of village v, zc represents characteristics of the Conseil
rural president, while θkc represents the reservation level of utility of representative k,
which depends, among other things, on his political ideology (which is independent of








represents the impact on the utility of a representative of the
distribution by the president of seats on the CCG,w h e r eNCR
vc is the number of elected
representatives sent by village v to the Conseil rural,a n dNCCG
vc is the corresponding
number of villagers named to the CCG by the president. Representatives from villages
that are over-represented on the CCG (NCCG
vc >N CR
vc ) are more likely to support the
president, ceteris paribus, with the intensity of this eﬀect being parameterized by δ>0.
Conversely, representatives from villages that are under-represented on the CCG are less
8likely to support the president. In the Political Science literature, the "representative-
ness" of a polity is often measured using indices of disproportionality or malapportionment
(the general problem being one of measuring inequity, as opposed to inequality). Dis-
proportionality refers to the divergence between the number of votes (seats) in a polity
attributed to a given political party or social group with respect to their relative impor-
tance in the population, whereas malapportionment refers to the same type of divergence,
but based on geographical location (for example, Vermont and California both have two
Senators, despite the important diﬀerence in their relative shares of the US population).
Though it would be possible to specify this CCG over-representation eﬀect in terms of
some form of disproportionality or malapportionment index such as those proposed by
Loosemore and Hanby (1971) or Rae (1971), the chosen parameterization allows for a
simple closed-form solution to the two-stage optimization problem of the president.11
We adopt an additive speciﬁcation in terms of over-representation on the CCG in order
to allow for situations in which a village is not represented, either on the Conseil rural,
or on the CCG.
Returning to the speciﬁcation of preferences given in (2), the parameter εvc allows for
heterogeneity in the weighting by representatives of village and Conseil rural president
characteristics, as well as malapportionment in the allocation of seats on the CCG,o n
the one hand, and obtaining funds, on the other. In terms of the Dixit and Londregan
(1996) model, εvc would be interpreted as being a measure of the "core support" that
the president enjoys in a given village. The parameter 1 − γ, for its part, represents
the elasticity of a representative’s utility with respect to obtaining funds. The additive
speciﬁcation in terms of funds (i.e. the 1+gvc term) is chosen in order to allow for
situations in which a representative might support a president even in the absence of
funding for his village, if village characteristics warrant this or presidential attributes are
particularly to his liking.
The basic intuition of this simple model is that the Conseil rural president can "buy"
some degree of support by over-representing certain villages on the CCG, though this
process is constrained by the ill-will generated in villages with large numbers of represen-
tatives on the Conseil rural and which are under-represented. The fundamental tradeoﬀ
11On the manner of measuring disproportionality or malapportionment, see also Rose (1984), Lijphart (1985), Gallagher
(1991), Cox and Shugart (1991), Fry and McLean (1991), Monroe (1994) and Chiaramonte (1995). Pennisi (1998) provides
a recent survey.
9captured by the model is therefore that between allocating PNIR funds, on the one hand,
and allocating seats on the CCG, on the other.







vc ,x vc,z c,ε vc,θ kc
¢
> 0. (3)
The Conseil rural president is uncertain about the preferences of representatives but
assumes that θkc is distributed in his CR c according to the uniform probability density
function (pdf )w i t hm e a nμc,a n dd e ﬁned over the interval [μc− 1
2dc,μ c+ 1
2dc]; 1
2dc is thus a
measure of heterogeneity among representatives in a given CR in terms of their reservation
utility (and therefore in terms of their ideology). Given this functional assumption on
the pdf of θkc, it is then easy to show that the probability that a representative in Conseil































of representatives on the CCG, it follows




















gvc = Gc. (5)
Letting λc denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint, the













vc ,v=1 ,...,V. (6)

















π + θct + ηvct, (7)
where ζ = γ−1α, π = γ−1δ, θct = γ−1 (zctβ − lnλct +l ndct) and ηvct = γ−1 (1 − γ)lnεvct.
Substituting back into the president’s objective function yields his initial, period 1,
































vct is given by (7). Note that it is straightforward to verify that one must have
γ>δfor this problem to be concave in NCCG
vc .S o l v i n g f o r NCCG
vc and substituting back
into (7) yields an alternative speciﬁcation given by:
ln(1 + g
∗






e π +e θct +e ηvct, (10)
where
e ζ =( γ − δ)
−1 α,e π = −(γ − δ)
−1 δ,e ηvct =( γ − δ)
−1 (1 − γ)lnεvct,






γ (1 − γ)
¶
+ zctβ − (1 − δ)lnλct − δlnϕc +l ndct
¸
,
and where ϕc is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (9).
Equation (7) is instructive in terms of the appropriate empirical speciﬁcation. On
the one hand, the evolution over time of the Lagrange multiplier associated with the CR
budget constraint (λct), the characteristics of the Conseil rural president (zct)a n dh e t e r o -
geneity in the distribution of ideology across representatives in the CR, as parameterized
by dct,a r ea l la c c o u n t e df o rb yCR-period-speciﬁce ﬀects θct.I ne q u a t i o n( 1 0 ) ,e θct also
accounts for any variation in the severity of the constraint on the total number of CCG
members. On the other hand, note that the village-CR-time eﬀects represented by εvct
are subsumed in the error term ηvct (or e ηvct)o ft h es p e c i ﬁcation. Though it is possible
that some degree of correlation will persist between the explanatory variables xvct,NCR
vc
(and NCCG
vc in (7)) and this disturbance term, we can reduce the likelihood of this by
including time-invariant village-speciﬁce ﬀects alongside the CR-period-speciﬁce ﬀects.
Nevertheless, keeping this last point in mind, it is wise to exercise caution in drawing
causal inference concerning the determinants of who gets projects and who does not on
the basis of equation (7). Note that equation (10) is arguably less likely to be aﬀected by
endogeneity issues than (7) in that it excludes the number of villagers on the CCG,w h i c h
is a choice variable available to the president. On the other hand, CCG membership
11is determined well before the allocation of projects, and can therefore be taken as being
predetermined. In what follows, we shall present results that correspond both to (7) and
to (10).
The data used in this paper stem in part from a unique set of administrative databases
that we collected while conducting a quasi-experimental impact evaluation of the PNIR.
Over a period of two years (2003−2005), we followed almost 800 rural households (with
a survey every six months, yielding 5 observations for each village and each household),
roughly half of whom resided in 21 CRs that were eventually treated by the PNIR, and
half of whom resided in 15 control CRs that were not treated by the PNIR. For two
randomly selected villages in each CR we collected information on whether a PNIR project
was completed. Concomitantly, we collected the administrative data that constitutes the
crux of this paper, namely the characteristics of the 1,209 members of the Conseils ruraux
and the 697 members of the CCGs that correspond to our 36 CRs, plus an additional 12
control CRs (i.e. not eligible for the PNIR) where we did not follow households. This
broader dataset, which describes all political representatives in each of our 48 CRs will
be described in detail in part 3. For the time being it will be suﬃcient to note that the
subsample used in our study of the allocation of PNIR funds covers the 71 villages in
which we conducted household surveys, most of which are observed over 5 periods, for a
total of 341 observations. Of these 341 village-time periods, 28 boasted a Conseil rural
president and 19 a Conseil rural vice-president. On average, a village-period in this
sample sends 1.25 representatives to the Conseil rural (std. =2 .80)a n d1.13 members
to the CCG (std. =2 .93). Most villages in this sample (75%) were not connected to the
national electricity grid, whereas 52% beneﬁted from a national literacy program. Mean
village size was 1,331 inhabitants (std. =1 ,538).
The result of estimating equations (7) and (10) are presented in Table 1. The depen-
dent variable takes on the value 1 when the village receives a completed PNIR project and
thus gvit > 0 (with the dependent variable remaining equal to 1 thereafter) whereas it is
equal to zero when the village has no PNIR project and therefore gvit =0 .O f t h e 341 ob-
servations (village-periods) in our dataset, 92 beneﬁted from a completed PNIR project,
with the three main forms of infrastructure being potable water, a primary school, and a
health center. The key elements of xvct are two dummy variables that indicate whether a
12villager is Conseil rural president or vice-president. The matrix xvct also includes dummy
variables that indicate whether the village is connected to the national electricity grid
and whether the village is the beneﬁciary of a national literacy program, as well as the
logarithm of village population. All speciﬁcations, including the baseline presented in
column (1), control for CR-period speciﬁce ﬀects in order to account for θct in equation
(7) or e θct in equation (7). Standard errors are calculated using the Huber-White formula.
Two empirical results stand out in column (1). First, a villager being president of the
Conseil rural signiﬁcantly increases the likelihood of the village receiving a PNIR project.
In quantitative terms, the Conseil rural presidency increases this likelihood by 11% and
is highly signiﬁcant (p−value=0 .012). Second, holding the Conseil rural vice-presidency
does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect a village’s likelihood of receiving a PNIR project.






which corresponds to the theoretical speciﬁcation given by equation (10). The coeﬃ-
cient associated with holding the presidency more than doubles, to 0.263,w h i l et h a t
associated with the number of villagers present on the Conseil rural, e π,i se q u a lt o
−0.106 (p−value=0 .024), and is negative as predicted by our theoretical model (since
e π = −(γ − δ)
−1 δ<0). In column (3) we include time-invariant village random eﬀects
in order to control, in a nested fashion, for at least a portion of e ηvct: their orthogonality
with respect to the explanatory variables is not rejected by the appropriate Hausman
test. None of the essential results reported in column (2) are signiﬁcantly aﬀected.
















. We also include a dummy variable that is equal
to one when a villager is a CCG commission president. Two results are worth noting.
First, as with Conseil rural vice-presidencies, CCG commission presidencies do not aﬀect
the likelihood of a village receiving a PNIR project; results are almost identical when we
drop this variable (not reported). Second, and in conformity with the theoretical model











. In column (5) we relax the restriction (which is











sum to zero, yielding a slightly less restrictive version of (7). As suggested











is negative and also
statistically signiﬁcant. Notice also that the results are robust to restricting the sample
to those 249 observations that correspond to villages that eventually become eligible for
PNIR funds, as shown in column (6).





in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6)











(4)) provides compelling evidence that malapportionment between seats on the Conseil
rural a n do nt h eCCG is an important component of the preferences of representatives:
a simpler model in which only 1+NCCG
vc w o u l da p p e a ri ne q u a t i o n( 2 )c o u l dn o ty i e l d
this result. In contrast, the positive coeﬃcient associated with 1+NCCG
vc is compatible
with a model in which the feasible set from which the vector (g1c,...,gvc,...,gVc) is drawn
is determined by the allocation of CCG seats. This would be the case, for example, in a
bargaining model of bicameral legislatures in which the malapportioned house (the CCG
here) has proposal power, such as that recently proposed by Ansolabehere, Snyder, and
Ting (2003).12 In both cases, agenda setting would appear to provide the most reasonable
theoretical framework within which to interpret our econometric results.
A ﬁnal remark on our ﬁndings involves the impact of village population on the likeli-
hood of obtaining a PNIR project. Contrary to what one might imagine, but in confor-
mity with the negative coeﬃcient associated with village representation on the Conseil
rural, the probability of obtaining a PNIR project is a signiﬁcantly decreasing function
of village population.13 A potential explanation for this result might be that the CCG
















where Pvc represents the population of village v. In this context, representatives will be
more (less) likely to support the president not only when their village is over (under)-
r e p r e s e n t e do nt h eCCG with respect to its representation on the Conseil rural,b u ta l s o
when it is over (under)-represented on the CCG with respect to its population.
12See, in particular, their Proposition 4. If proposal power were vested in the Conseil rural (which is not the case here)
then their model would predict no impact of CCG representation on the likelihood of obtaining a PNIR project.
13The exception being the time-invariant village-speciﬁcr a n d o me ﬀect results presented in column (3), in which the
village eﬀects presumably render the identiﬁcation of the impact of village population (which changes relatively little over
time) problematic.
14The jist of these empirical results is (i) that the pattern of allocation of PNIR funds
is consistent with an agenda-setting model in which the preferences of Conseil rural
representatives are a function of the malapportionment in the "bicameral" structure es-
tablished by CDD and (ii) that the identity of leaders –in this case the village of origin
of the Conseil rural president– is one of the key determinants of whether a village re-
ceives a PNIR project or not. In quantitative terms, holding the presidency increases the
likelihood of a village receiving a completed project by between 11 and 26%,d e p e n d i n g
upon the speciﬁcation, and these marginal eﬀects are always estimated quite precisely.
3 Who gets elected president of the Conseil rural?
3.1 Observable characteristics
Having established, in the Senegalese case, that leadership is one of the most important
determinants of which villages receive CDD projects and which do not, we now turn
to understanding the determinants of leadership per se. There are least ﬁve observable
dimensions along which candidates for the presidency may appeal to members of the
Conseil rural.T h e ﬁrst is their political party. Though there is a plethora of political
parties in our sample, there are four that are empirically relevant: the Parti Démocratique
Sénégalais (PDS) of President Wade, the Parti Socialiste (PS) of former president Abdou
Diouf, the AFP and the URD.14 Political experience, as measured for example by one’s
tenure on the Conseil rural, is likely to be an important factor that could increase the
likelihood of election of incumbent members to the presidency.
The second dimension is ethnicity: as noted above, ethnicity has been identiﬁed by
many researchers as the essential individual characteristic in modern African societies.
In Senegal, however, there is a widespread belief that ethnicity is not as important as
in many other African countries, though the rebellion in Casamance (and the conﬂict
between the local Diola ethnic group and Wolof "colonizers") can in part be attributed
to ethnic tensions. Senegal is also particular in that, apart from French, Wolof has
become the lingua franca (on Woloﬁsation in Senegal see O’Brien 1998).
14Note that, in his analysis of the 1996 local elections, using a nationally-representative sample, Vengroﬀ and Ndiaye
(1998) identify the PDS and the PS as being in the "big four", whereas two parties, the Ligue Démocratique (LD) and
the And Jëf-Parti Africain pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme (AJ) are not in our list. There are two reasons for
this diﬀerence. First, as noted earlier, our sample is not representative of Senegal as a whole, but rather of poor rural
communities. Second, given that our data correspond to the 2003-5 period, things have evolved since their work.
15Human capital is a third dimension through which candidates can diﬀerentiate them-
selves. This is in part due to the important degree of social diﬀerentiation in Senegal
that is based on educational attainment (Patterson 1998), though this simplistic linear
p i c t u r ei sc o m p l i c a t e db yt h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h eI s l a m i cm o v e m e n ti ng e n e r a la n d
Islamic education in particular (Villalon 1995). Pure age eﬀects are also likely to be
a prominent determinant of an individual being categorized as "presidentiable". This
last characteristic is even embodied in Article 203 of the Local Community Code which
determines the procedure to be followed during the election of the Conseil rural presi-
dent: if one reaches a third vote, because no candidate has obtained an absolute majority
during the ﬁrst two votes, in which case a plurality determines the winner, and if that
third or any subsequent votes are tied, it is the oldest candidate who is declared the
winner. Other procedural speciﬁcities conﬁrm the importance of age: the meeting of
the Conseil rural in which the president is elected is presided over by the Conseil rural’s
oldest member.
Professional aﬃliation, based in part on traditional cleavages between various castes
(warriors, griots, slaves), but more concretely on diﬀerences between peasants, merchants,
artisans or civil servants, is a fourth dimension of a candidate that might also be hypoth-
esized to play some role in determining whether he is worthy of, or suﬃciently represen-
tative for, the Conseil rural presidency
Finally, geographical loyalties, based on one’s village of origin, are likely, as everywhere
else in the world, to play a leading role in the selection of the Conseil rural president.
In what follows, we shall contrast the role played by those factors that determine who is
president from those that determine the vice-presidency.
3.2 How diﬀerent are Conseil rural presidents and vice-presidents from the
average member?
Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics on the members of the Conseil rural,a n d
contrast the characteristics of the 1,209 members at large with those of the 44 presi-
dents and 78 vice-presidents (in many, though not in all, Conseil ruraux there are two
vice-presidents).15 The p−values from simple t−tests of the equality, for a given char-
15In 4 out of the 48 Conseil ruraux in our sample, there was no president, which explains why we consider 44 presidents
in 48 Conseils ruraux.
16acteristic, between members overall and presidents and vice-presidents, respectively, are
also presented.
Conseil rural presidents and vice-presidents are similar to their members in terms of
mean age –48 years, with almost identical standard deviations. In contrast, no women
are presidents, and only 2.5% of vice-presidents are women, compared with 8.6% of all
representatives. Almost one-third of members have no schooling, and the proportion
of individuals with no schooling who are presidents and vice-presidents is signiﬁcantly
lower. Concomitantly, presidents and vice-presidents are signiﬁcantly more likely to
have attained secondary education, with presidents being much more likely to have some
higher (post-secondary) education. In contrast, presidents are signiﬁcantly less likely
than Conseil rural m e m b e r st oh a v ea t t e n d e dK o r a n i cs c h o o l .
More than three-quarters of members belong to the ethnic majority on the Conseil
rural, and this proportion is not statistically diﬀerent for presidents and vice-presidents.
In contrast, while 68.5% of members at large belong to the majority political party on
the Conseil rural, 93.1% of presidents do, and this diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant; vice-
presidents, for their part, have roughly the same probability of being a member of the
political majority as the average member. The political experience of members and
presidents is roughly similar –1.5 terms on the Conseil rural– while the experience of
vice-presidents is 0.27 terms greater than that of the average member, with the diﬀerence
being highly signiﬁcant. On average, members and vice-presidents both belong to vil-
lage delegations of slightly more than 5 representatives, with presidents stemming from
signiﬁcantly larger delegations of over 7 members.
Peasants account for over 50% of all members, and are grossly under-represented in
terms of Conseil rural presidents –27%, with the diﬀerence being highly signiﬁcant;
the proportion of vice-presidents who are peasants is roughly in line with the overall
average. Private (13.6%) and public sector (15.9%) employees are over-represented
among presidents (the corresponding proportions for average members are 3.3% and 4.9%,
respectively), while public sector employees are over-represented among vice-presidents.
Individuals whose livelihood is based on livestock –herders for the most part– account
for roughly 10% of members, and the same proportion of presidents, with the proportion
being signiﬁcantly lower for vice-presidents.
17Breaking political aﬃliation down by speciﬁc party (in the upper portion of Table
3) reveals the dominant role played by the PDS, with 53.5% being members of that
party. The proportion of presidents and vice-presidents who belong to the PDS is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the average for all representatives. In contrast, PS party
members, who represent 15.9% of all representatives, are signiﬁcantly more likely to be
vice-presidents, of whom they account for 25.6%,w h i l e ,a tt h e10% signiﬁcance level,
PIT party members are over-represented as presidents, while URD party members are
under-represented as vice-presidents. In terms of ethnic origin, on the other hand, there
is almost no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the proportions of each ethnic
group overall and presidents or vice-presidents, though the very small Soninké/Sarakholé
and Mandjag ethnic minorities claim one Conseil rural presidency each and are therefore
technically over-represented
The picture that emerges from these descriptive statistics and univariate comparisons
is that: (i) the average Conseil rural member is a 48 year old Wolof peasant who belongs
to the PDS party, with either no schooling or Koranic school, who belongs to the ethnic
majority (whether the latter is Wolof or is not), who belongs to a village delegation of 5
members, and half of whom have already served one term; (ii) in contrast, Conseil rural
presidents and vice-presidents are signiﬁcantly better educated, and are more likely to be
wage-earning employees (of the public sector, in particular); the distinguishing features
of vice-presidents, with respect to presidents, is that the former are more likely to be
peasants, have signiﬁcantly more political experience, are more likely to be PS party
members, and stem from average-sized village delegations, whereas presidents have a
signiﬁcantly larger village power base in the Conseil rural. Geographical and partisan
political support are key for Conseil rural presidents, whereas political experience and
belonging to the opposition at the national level (the PS) is the key distinguishing feature
of vice-presidents, who are closer to the average Conseil rural member than are presidents.
No ethnic group appears to be signiﬁcantly over-represented, with respect to the average
member, among presidents or vice-presidents.
183.3 The making of a Conseil rural (vice-) president
We now turn to identifying those characteristics that determine whether a member is a
president or a vice-president in a multivariate framework, while controlling for unobserved
Conseil rural- or village-speciﬁc heterogeneity. An intuitively appealling theoretical basis
for the empirical work that follows is provided by a simple model of multidimensional
voting.
We assume that the preferences of Conseil rural members, when it comes to choosing
a president, are linear, and that they can be represented by:
U (α,x)=α · x, (11)
with x =( x1,...,x j,...,xN) ∈ X,a n dw h e r eX ⊂ RN is the set of characteristics of a
given candidate for the presidency. In our case N =6 ,w i t hx being composed of (i) edu-
cational attainment, (ii) ethnicity, (iii) geographic (village) origin, (iv) political aﬃliation
and experience, (v) professional activity and (vi) unobservables. The vector α ∈ RN
represents the preferences of a representative. According to (11), each representative is
assumed to evaluate a candidate for the Conseil rural presidency as a weighted sum of
the candidate’s position along each dimension. The mean representative is deﬁned by:




where f (α) is the pdf according to which α is distributed across the population of Con-
seil rural members.16 We assume that f (α) is ρ−concave as deﬁn e di nt h ev e r s i o n
of the Prékopa-Borell Theorem presented in Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991). The mean
representative’s most preferred presidential candidate is denoted by:
x =a r gm a x
{x}
α · x. (13)
By Theorem 1 in Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991) a candidate with characteristics given by x







16Note that the usual Median Voter Theorem due to Black (1948) cannot be applied once candidates diﬀer in more than
one dimension.
19which is approximately equal, for N =6and ρ →∞ ,t o60%. Though this is higher
than the 50% rule that holds in practice, it is likely that the theoretical foundation for
our results is not a bad approximation of what takes place in the electoral arena that is
constituted by the Conseil rural. Moreover, the theoretical model provides an extremely
simple framework within which to interpret what matters in terms of election to the
Conseil rural presidency or vice-presidency.
Our purpose in what follows is to uncover the values of (α1,...,αj,...,αN) by estimating
a linear probability model over all representatives in our sample in which the dependent
variable is equal to 1 when the representative in question is elected Conseil rural president
and 0 otherwise, and where the explanatory variables are given by the representatives’
observable characteristics, which correspond to the vector (x1,...,xj,...,x N−1). Unob-
servable characteristics xN of the representative will be subsumed in the error term of
the model.
Our basic empirical speciﬁcation is a direct consequence of combining (11), (12) and
(13) and is given by :
yic = αxic + λc + εic, (15)
where i =1 ,...,I indexes individual representatives and c =1 ,...,C indexes Conseil
ruraux; λc is a Conseil rural-speciﬁce ﬀect and εic is a disturbance term that accounts for
the unobservable component of x and which is assumed to satisfy the usual hypotheses;
in particular, for our estimates to be consistent, we must assume that a representative’s
unobservable characteristics are orthogonal with respect to those that are observable
and included in (15). Though this is a matter of econometric faith, our inclusion of a
broad spectrum of individual characteristics in xic,a sw e l la st h eConseil rural eﬀects λc,
heightens our conﬁdence in the consistency of our estimates. An alternative speciﬁcation
replaces the Conseil rural index with a village-level index, where (as before) v =1 ,...,V





1 when representative i is Conseil rural president of CR c
0 otherwise
(16)
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 presents the results of a linear-probability estimation of
(15). In column 1 we control for Conseil rural speciﬁce ﬀects λc. I nc o l u m n2 ,w ec o n t r o l
20for village of origin eﬀects λv. Columns 3 and 4 present the corresponding results for the
determinants of Conseil rural vice-presidencies. On the basis of our simple theoretical
model, the parameters α estimated by our linear probability speciﬁcation correspond
to the mean preferences of representatives. Though we cannot interpret individual
coeﬃcients in absolute terms, since a voter’s preferences are, of course, only determined
up to a monotonically increasing transformation, we can intepret them in relative terms.
For example, if the coeﬃcient associated with characteristic j is statistically signiﬁcant
whereas the coeﬃcient associated with characteristic k is not, we can infer that the mean
representative cares about characteristic j while placing very little weight on characteristic
k.
The results conﬁrm and sharpen a number of regularities that were already apparent
in the context of the descriptive statistics. First, controlling for other characteristics,
older representatives are more likely to be Conseil rural presidents: a one percent increase
in age increases one’s likelihood of being Conseil rural president by between 6 and 11%,
depending upon whether one controls for Conseil rural or village of origin speciﬁce ﬀects.
Age does not aﬀect the probability of being a vice-president.
Second, as one would expect from the descriptive statistics, being a woman signiﬁcantly
reduces one’s chance of being either a president or a vice-president.
Third, educational attainment increases a member’s probability of being a president
or a vice-president. For example, possessing post-secondary education increases one’s
probability of being a president by almost 18% when one controls for village of origin-
speciﬁce ﬀects, with respect to the "no education" baseline category. For vice-presidents,
it is secondary education that plays this role, although its quantitative eﬀect is smaller.
Individuals who are literate in a "national language" are slightly more likely to become
vice-presidents. Koranic schooling is not associated with any signiﬁcant eﬀects in terms
of becoming president or vice-president
Fourth, ethnicity would appear to play no role in determining whether a member
becomes a Conseil rural president. On the one hand, belonging to the ethnic majority
on the Conseil rural is not a statistically signiﬁcant determinant of presidencies. On
the other, the 11 ethnic group dummies are not jointly signiﬁcant (p−value in excess of
0.5). The same is true of vice-presidencies, although the p−value of the ethnic group
21dummies falls to 0.126 when one controls for village of origin speciﬁce ﬀects: this eﬀect is
entirely due to the two vice-presidencies that go to the Soninké/Sarakholé and Mandjag
minorities.
Fifth, professional aﬃnities play a limited role in determining presidencies (this is
not the case for vice-presidencies), with the "member of the largest professional group"
dummy being marginally signiﬁcant and the principal activity dummies being jointly
signiﬁcant when one accounts for Conseil rural speciﬁce ﬀects.
Sixth, political factors appear to be of paramount importance in determining both
presidencies and vice-presidencies, as the "member of the majority political party" dummy
is signiﬁcant for both oﬃces, while our measure of political experience is a signiﬁcant de-
terminant of vice-presidencies. As appeared in the descriptive statistics, vice-presidents
appear to be chosen largely on the basis of their previous terms on the Conseil rural.
Finally, as was apparent in the descriptive statistics, geographical loyalties are an
important determinant of presidencies, while they have no impact on the probability
of a member becoming vice-president. The diﬀerence in the size of village delegations
between presidents and the average member (2 members) accounts for roughly a one
percent diﬀerence in the likelihood of being Conseil rural president.
These results are robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations in terms of the power of the ethnic
group, political party, village or profession to which each representative belongs, and
we report results that demonstrate this invariance of our ﬁndings in Table 5. The most
commonly used indices of political power are those developed by Shapley and Shubik
(1954) and Banzhaf (1965).17 Based on the concept of the value of an n-person coopera-
tive weighted voting game, power indices, which are sometimes referred to as semivalues
(Dubey, Neyman and Weber 1981), measure a given group’s ap r i o r ipossibilities of in-
ﬂuencing the outcome of a vote in the Conseil rural. The Shapley-Shubik index, for
example, represents the expected number of times a set of representatives (belonging
to a given ethnic group, village, political party or profession) will be in a pivotal po-
sition, where being pivotal means that one’s defection from a winning coalition would
turn it into a losing one, and assumes that all permutations (i.e. vote sequences) are
equally probable. The Banzhaf index, on the other hand, assumes that all coalitions
17Note that our speciﬁcation in which the power of a village is simply given by the number of representatives that it
sends to the Conseil rural is compatible, in a unicameral setting, with the model of legislative bargaining proposed by
Snyder, Ting, and Ansolabehere (2005), who question the power index approach.
22are equiprobable. Here we use the Penrose version of this measure, also known as the
Absolute Banzhaf index. Results are almost identical when we use the Shapley-Shubik
or Coleman measures of power. Speciﬁcations are presented which account either for
Conseil rural or for village of origin speciﬁce ﬀects. The results conﬁrm the importance
of the political power of the village from which a representative hails and the political
party to which he belongs as determinants of the presidency and vice-presidency. All
other coeﬃcients and joint signiﬁcance tests remain qualitatively unchanged with respect
to the results presented in Table 4.
As was already apparent in the context of the descriptive statistics, it is therefore
obvious that ethnicity plays almost no role in determining who becomes Conseil rural
president or vice-president, while party politics, geographical loyalties and, to a lesser
extent, professional aﬃnities, are the key determinants, alongside age, political experience
(for vice-presidents) and educational attainment.
3.4 Are political parties just a veil for regional or ethnic cleavages?
While the results presented so far suggest that ethnic issues are not a signiﬁcant factor in
determining who becomes Conseil rural president or vice-president, it may be that we are
missing something and that our results hide cleavages along regional or ethnic lines. In
other words, perhaps the relative importance of party politics in determining presidencies
and vice-presidencies is only a screen behind which ethnic concerns are lurking.
Our focus is on the four big political parties in our sample (PDS, PS, AFP and URD),
which account for 91% of the representatives. At the CR level of disaggregation, the
P D Si sp r e s e n ti n4 6o u to fat o t a lo f4 8Conseil ruraux, the PS is present in 40, with
the AFP and the URD holding seats in 30 and 17 Conseil ruraux, respectively. A ﬁrst,
extremely crude measure of the geographical concentration of political parties is given by
t h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h eCR that accounts for the largest number of a given party’s
representatives. For the PDS, the Communauté rurale of Keur Samba Kane (Djiourbel
region) accounts for the largest contingent of its representatives, and this represents a
mere 4.34% of the total. For the PS, the corresponding CR is Thilmaka (Thiès region),
which accounts for 10.84 % of all PS members. For the AFP, Lour Escale (Kolda region
in Casamance) accounts for 13.64 % of its members in our sample. Finally, for the URD,
23t h em o s ti m p o r t a n tCR is Déali (Louga region) which accounts for 20.41 % of the party’s
representatives in our sample. These ﬁgures are a ﬁrst indication that the AFP and
URD are more concentrated regionally than are the PDS and the PS.
A second, synthetic, measure of the geographical concentration of political parties is
given by a Herﬁndahl index computed on the basis of the relative importance of each CR
as a share of a party’s total stock of representatives. If all of a party’s representatives were
concentrated in a single CR, the index would equal 100%, whereas an evenly distributed





¢2×100 ≈ 2.08%. The PDS is the most evenly distributed political party
in our sample with a CR Herﬁndahl of 2.98 % (close to the minimum), followed by the
PS with 4.64 %. The AFP and URD are more locally concentrated with CR Herﬁndahls
of 7.35 % and 12.76 %, respectively.
If we move to a higher level of aggregation –the regional, rather than the CR level–
the diﬀerences between the ﬁr s tt w op a r t i e sa n dt h el a t t e rt w oa r ee v e nm o r ea p p a r e n t .
As shown by the statistics presented in Table 6, the AFP is extremely powerful in the
Kaolack region, where it accounts for 83 representatives out of a total of 187, compared
with the AFP’s total stock 176 representatives in our dataset. Similarly, the URD is
mainly present in the Louga region, where it accounts for 87 out of 181 representatives:
this region accounts for 88.77 % of the URD representatives in our sample. If we compute
Herﬁndahl indices at the regional level (the empirical minimum for our dataset would be
an Herﬁndahl of 100
9 ≈ 11.11%), the least regionally concentrated party is the PDS, with
ar e g i o n a lH e r ﬁndahl of 13.07 %, followed by the PS with 15.72 %, and the AFP with
27.41 %. The URD, for its part, comes in at 79.15 %, thereby conﬁrming the regional
nature of this political grouping.
Tables 7 and 8 present breakdowns of party membership as a function of profession
and ethnic group. These data are then combined with personal characteristics in a
multivariate framework in Table 9, where we consider the determinants of membership in
the four main parties of our sample, for the four main ethnic groups (Wolof/Lébou, Pular,
Serèr, Manding/Socé) in a multinomial logit framework.18 The excluded political party
that constitutes the reference group is the PDS. Columns 1 to 3 present raw multinomial
18The Manding/Socé dummy drops out of the estimations presented in Table 9, due to the tiny number of representatives
from these ethnic groups.
24logit results. Columns 4 to 6 control for CR-speciﬁce ﬀects using the Mundlak procedure
(see e.g. Wooldridge 2002), whereas columns 7 to 9 do the same but controlling for village
of origin eﬀects.
Several aspects of the results are worth noting. First, the simple multinomial logit
results indicate that PS members are signiﬁcantly older than their PDS counterparts,
whereas there is no age diﬀerence for AFP and URD members. The signiﬁcant age
diﬀerence for PS members disappears once village of origin speciﬁce ﬀects are controlled
for, with AFP membership appearing to be associated with older individuals.
Second, the URD appears to be the only party that is signiﬁcantly more feminine than
the PDS, and this irrespective of the speciﬁcation considered.
Third, individuals who completed Koranic schooling or are literate in a "national
language" are more likely to be AFP or URD members than they are to be PDS members,
though this eﬀect disappears once CR or village of origin speciﬁce ﬀects are allowed for.
In all speciﬁcations, individuals with primary or secondary schooling are more likely to
be members of the AFP than of the PDS, whereas PS members are indistinguishable
from PDS members in terms of their educational attainment. Higher education does not
have any eﬀect on political aﬃliation that varies with respect to the PDS baseline.
Fourth, ethnicity only plays a role in terms of membership of the AFP: in the raw
multinomial logit results, members of the Pular ethnic group are more likely to be mem-
bers of the AFP, whereas Serèr are less likely to be AFP members once village of origin
eﬀects are included. Note that there are no other signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the results
concerning ethnicity between the raw multinomial logit results and those which control
for CR or village of origin eﬀects: the village of origin eﬀects are thus not obscuring the
presence of any signiﬁcant ethnic concerns, as one might be led to believe.
Finally, belonging to the "other" professional category increases the likelihood of being
a member of the URD, as does being in the construction or livestock sectors. Being
in "trade" also increases the likelihood of one being in the AFP or the URD. Other
professional categories appear to have no impact on the party to which one belongs.
The upshot is that, apart from a relatively mild (negative) eﬀect of being Serèr (con-
trolling for village of origin) on the likelihood of being a AFP member, ethnicity plays no
role in determining political allegiance. Though the AFP and URD political parties do
25display a relatively high degree of regional concentration, this does not appear to be par-
ticularly correlated with ethnicity. Political parties therefore do not appear to be a veil
for ethnic fractionalization in the Senegalese context, and those factors that determine
Conseil rural presidencies and vice-presidencies can safely be said not to include ethnic
allegiance.
4F r o m t h e Conseil rural to the CCG
So far, we have focused our attention on the determinants of Conseil rural presidencies
and vice-presidencies. However, as mentioned in part 2, the Conseil rural is not the
only body that has decisionmaking and agenda-setting power concerning the identiﬁca-
tion and attribution of microprojects. Indeed, as we showed earlier, the size of village
representation on the CCG also increases the likelihood of receiving PNIR funds. The
question we now pose is the following: does the CCG a c t u a l l yp l a yt h er o l et h a ti ti s
supposed to according to CDD rethoric, in terms of ensuring the voice of disenfranchised
groups in CR-level institutions? Or is the CCG simply a toothless oﬀshoot of the Conseil
rural, which essentially reinforces the importance of those factors that already determine
Conseil rural presidencies and vice-presidencies?
One simple manner of comparing the representativity of the Conseil ruraux versus
that of the CCGs is to compute the eﬀective number of villages, parties, ethnic groups,
and professions represented in each body. The eﬀective number of parties, for example,
is simply the inverse of the corresponding Herﬁndahl index (expressed in absolute, not
percentage, terms). These numbers are presented in Table 10, for those cases where both
institutions exist. On average, there are two eﬀective parties, two ethnic groups, three
professions and between eight and nine villages. The only variable where the CCG can
be deemed to be signiﬁcantly more representative than the Conseil rural is professional
aﬃliation.
T h er e s u l tt h a tt h ee ﬀective number of professional categories is greater on CCGs than
on the Conseil ruraux provides some evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the coopted
nature of CCGs allows them to redress the vagaries of the results from the ballot box.
It does not, however, demonstrate that Conseil rural presidents systematically attempt
to redress the balance of power that results from the electoral process.
26In order to study this phenomenon more formally, Table 11 considers the determinants
of who becomes a CCG commission president, which provides evidence on the outcome
of the interaction between the preferences of the president of the Conseil rural (and thus
the president of the CCG) and the wish for additional voice for under-represented groups
that underlies the formation of the CCG.T h o u g h CCG commission presidencies do not
directly aﬀect the allocation of PNIR funds (as we demonstrated empirically in part 2),
the interaction between the two tiers of leadership established by CDD "bicameralism"
is of independent interest, and might indirectly aﬀe c tt h ea t t r i b u t i o no fP N I Rp r o j e c t si f
CCG commission presidencies aﬀect the set of feasible projects among which the president
chooses.19 In addition to the individual characteristics included in our analysis of Conseil
rural presidencies and vice-presidencies, we include variables describing the similarity
between a given member of the CCG and the Conseil rural president (in terms of ethnic
group, political party, professional category and village of origin). Three results are
worth noting.
First, age and gender are not signiﬁcant determinants of CCG commission presidencies,
whereas primary education is. The absence of a signiﬁcant negative gender eﬀect, in
contrast to the Conseil rural results (where women were found to be signiﬁcantly less
likely to be Conseil rural presidents), indicates, at least, that there is no gender-bias in
terms of the allocation of CCG commission presidencies.
Second, and contrary to the results concerning Conseil rural presidencies and vice-
presidencies, the various measures of political power considered earlier (whether dummy
variables or power indices) do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the probability of obtaining a CCG
commission presidency, with the notable exception of the political weight of the village.
Indeed, the coeﬃcient associated with village political power, as measured by its Shapley-
Shubik index in terms of CCG representatives, is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at
usual levels of conﬁdence. This result is robust to changes in the measure of village
political power using, for example, two diﬀerent Coleman indices or simply the number
of representatives, and it is only with the Penrose index (as shown in the ﬁrst column of
t h eT a b l e )t h a tt h ee ﬀect is statistically insigniﬁcant. The ﬁnding implies that villages
with more representatives on the CCG are systematically less likely to have one of their
19In order to study this phenomenon formally one would need information on the set of potential projects from which
those actually implemented were chosen. Though we do have some information on rejected projects, it is not, unfortunately,
suﬃciently detailed or complete for us to be able to study this process econometrically.
27representatives become a CCG commission president, in contrast to the Conseil rural,
where belonging to a powerful village delegation increased the likelihood of obtaining the
presidency. What this means is that the political process within the CCG results in
what appears to be a conscious eﬀort to reequilibrate the geographical concentration of
power that is the outcome of the choice of the Conseil rural president.
Third, despite the negative impact of village power on the likelihood of obtaining a
CCG commission presidency, hailing from the same village as the Conseil rural president,
increases this likelihood, while belonging to the same professional group reduces it. The
importance of being from the same village as the Conseil rural president highlights the
power wielded by the holder of this oﬃce and conﬁrms the importance of geographical
loyalties. The last result probably stems from an attempt to reequilibrate the relative
under-representation of peasants in terms of Conseil rural vice-presidencies, with the
CCG commission presidencies constituting the consolation prizes.
In summary, our empirical ﬁndings concerning the CCG reinforce the view that ethnic-
ity does not matter in terms of local political institutions in Senegal, whereas geographical
loyalties are paramount. Concomitantly, the diﬀerences between those factors that deter-
mine Conseil rural presidencies and those that determine CCG commission presidencies
reveal an interesting and subtle process by which the weight of village loyalties is tempered
in favor of broader geographical and professional representativity.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper we have considered the interaction between local politics and CDD opera-
tions in Senegal. In our opinion, there are two ﬁndings that are particularly interesting.
First, political leadership at the local level in Senegal is essentially a function of party
politics and geographic loyalties, as well as personal characteristics such as educational
attainment, but is not based on ethnicity. Moreover, party politics are not a veil behind
which ethnic issues are hiding. In light of the focus of much of the economics litera-
ture dealing with Africa on the problems induced by ethnic conﬂict, this is comforting,
and calls for a closer look at the role played by political institutions and party politics.
There are also subtle interactions between local political institutions (the Conseil rural)
and those created speciﬁcally by CDD (the CCG), which reveal an attempt to increase
28t h er e p r e s e n t a t i o no fg r o u p st h a tm a yb es o m e w h a tl e f to u ti nt h ec o m p e t i t i v ep o l i t i c a l
arena. The participative rhetoric of CDD is therefore not all rhetoric, at least in Senegal,
and actually does translate into facts on the ground.
Second, democratic leadership is not a vacuous concept in Senegal, and it leads directly
to political power that aﬀects the decentralized allocation of resources in the context of
CDD. As such, our results are in tune with recent empirical work based on cross-country
evidence by Brambor, Roberts Clark, and Golder (2006), who argue that electoral systems
are no diﬀerent in Africa than elsewhere in the world, contrary to the competing notion of
African exceptionalism promoted, for example, by Mozaﬀar, Scarritt, and Galaich (2003).
A village that holds the Conseil rural presidency signiﬁcantly increases its likelihood of
receiving a CDD project. Given that leadership is not the product of ethnic concerns, it
follows that the allocation of CDD funds in Senegal is largely driven by the competitive
party (pork-barrel) politics and the usual workings of geographic loyalties. In Senegal,
as elsewhere, the old adage holds: all politics is local –and so are the mechanisms by
which the spoils of CDD are divided.
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32Dependent variable Village has received a completed PNIR Project
Mean of dependent variable 0.269 0.269 0.269 0.269 0.269 0.369
Villager is: ( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )






























Log number of villagers:
on CCG minus that on Conseil rural 0.103
(0.03)
























CR-period speciﬁce ﬀects included yes yes yes yes yes yes





Number of observations 341 341 341 341 341 249
Number of villages 71 71 71 71 71 52
σ 0.183 0.177 0.178 0.176 0.175 0.269
R
2
0.830 0.840 0.838 0.842 0.843 0.688
Table 1: The determinants of which villages receive a PNIR project and which do not, linear probability
model; 5 periods, 36 communautés rurales, 71 villages, 176 Communautés rurales-time periods, 341
observations (92 observations correspond to villages that received a PNIR project; Huber-White standard
errors in parentheses below coeﬃcients); dummy variables for connection to the national electricity grid
and presence of a literacy program included in all speciﬁcations.
33All Presidents p−value Vice p−value











Female 0.086 0.025 0.047
Educational attainment:
No schooling 0.317 0.181 0.049 0.179 0.007
Primary education 0.153 0.113 0.452 0.217 0.105
Secondary education 0.170 0.295 0.025 0.282 0.007
Higher education 0.043 0.204 0.000 0.051 0.710
Literate in "national language" 0.100 0.113 0.760 0.102 0.940
Koranic schooling 0.215 0.090 0.041 0.166 0.283
Ethnicity:
Member of ethnic majority 0.766 0.795 0.647 0.807 0.377
Professional activity:
Member of largest professional group 0.833 0.772 0.268 0.782 0.205
Politics and political experience:
Member of majority political party 0.685 0.931 0.000 0.743 0.255
















Peasant 0.5028 0.2727 0.002 0.4743 0.603
Trade 0.1373 0.0909 0.363 0.1538 0.661
Livestock 0.1091 0.0909 0.692 0.0512 0.090
Other 0.0893 0.2045 0.006 0.1282 0.214
Public sector employee 0.0496 0.1590 0.001 0.1153 0.006
Private sector employee 0.0330 0.1363 0.000 0.0384 0.784
None 0.0206
Artisan 0.0198
Construction 0.0132 0.0128 0.974






Table 2: Characteristics of members, presidents and vice-presidents (standard deviations in parenthe-
ses where appropriate); 44 Conseils ruraux and Conseil rural presidents, 78 vice-presidents and 1,209
representatives from a total of 619 villages.
34All Presidents p−value Vice p−value




PDS 0.5351 0.5227 0.866 0.5769 0.445
PS 0.1596 0.1590 0.992 0.2564 0.016
AFP 0.1397 0.1590 0.707 0.0897 0.188
URD 0.0794 0.0681 0.779 0.0256 0.070
LD/MPT 0.0223 0.0227 0.986
Independent 0.0165 0.0454 0.126 0.0128 0.790
AJ/PADS 0.0157 0.0128 0.832
ADN 0.0115 0.0256 0.230









Wolof/Lébou 0.5012 0.4545 0.528 0.4743 0.624
Pular 0.2539 0.2500 0.951 0.2435 0.828
Serèr 0.1050 0.0909 0.756 0.1025 0.941
Manding/Socé 0.0496 0.0681 0.564 0.0641 0.543
Diola 0.0256 0.0454 0.397 0.0512 0.139
Soninké/Sarakholé 0.0033 0.0227 0.022 0.0128 0.131
Mandjag 0.0033 0.0227 0.022 0.0128 0.131
Balante 0.0016
Other Senegalese ethnic group 0.0554 0.0454 0.769 0.0384 0.499
Other Senegalese 0.0008
Table 3: Political aﬃliation and ethnic group of members, presidents and vice-presidents; 44 Conseils
ruraux and Conseil rural presidents, 78 vice-presidents and 1,190 representatives from a total of 611
villages.
35Dependent variable Representative Representative
is Conseil rural is Conseil rural
president vice-president
Estimator Conseil Village of Conseil Village of













































































Politics and political experience:






















Ethnic group dummies: p−value 0.943 0.096 0.929 0.604
Profession dummies: p−value 0.020 0.330 0.041 0.015
Political aﬃliation dummies: p−value 0.802 0.753 0.020 0.191
σ 0.181 0.215 0.244 0.254
R2 0.135 0.408 0.087 0.519
Table 4: The making of a Conseil rural president (and vice-president). Linear probability model: de-
pendent variable equals 1 when member is president (vice-president), zero otherwise (standard errors in
parentheses); 44 Conseils ruraux and Conseil rural presidents, 78 vice-presidents and 1,190 representa-
tives from a total of 611 villages; for joint signiﬁcance tests, excluded ethnic group is "Wolof/Lébou",
excluded political party is "PDS" and excluded profession is "peasant".
36Dependent variable Representative Representative
is Conseil rural is Conseil rural
president vice-president
Estimator Conseil Village of Conseil Village of













































































Politics and political experience:






















Ethnic group dummies: p−value 0.919 0.096 0.942 0.750
Profession dummies: p−value 0.022 0.312 0.042 0.012
Political aﬃliation dummies: p−value 0.834 0.777 0.015 0.150
σ 0.181 0.215 0.244 0.254
R2 0.135 0.408 0.087 0.519
Table 5: The making of a Conseil rural president (and vice-president): Penrose measures of power
of ethnic group, profession, political party and village. Linear probability model: dependent variable
equals 1 when member is president (vice-president), zero otherwise (standard errors in parentheses); 44
Conseils ruraux and Conseil rural presidents, 78 vice-presidents and 1,190 representatives from a total
of 611 villages; for joint signiﬁcance tests, excluded ethnic group is "Wolof/Lébou", excluded political
party is "PDS" and excluded profession is "peasant".
37Political Party Total
PDS PS AFP URD
Region:
Diourbel 123 14 27 1 165
Fatick 36 12 14 1 63
Kolda 51 12 17 1 81
Kaolack 71 31 83 2 187
Louga 47 43 4 87 181
Saint-Louis 115 14 10 5 144
Tambacounda 93 18 16 0 127
Thiès 111 51 17 1 167
Ziguinchor 44 8 0 0 53
Total 691 203 176 98 1,168
Table 6: The four major political parties in poor regions of rural Senegal: political aﬃliation of Conseil
rural representatives by region.
Political Party Total
PDS PS AFP URD
Profession:
Peasant 314 82 79 15 490
Trade 71 30 30 12 143
Livestock 32 27 11 53 123
Other 50 10 16 10 86
Public sector employee 28 3 6 0 37
Private sector employee 17 4 2 2 25
Artisan 12 4 3 0 19
None 81 2 01 1
Contruction 82 0 11 1
Transportation sector 72 1 01 0
Fisherman 50 0 0 5
Mechanic 30 0 0 3
Total 555 165 150 93 963
Table 7: The four major political parties in poor regions of rural Senegal: political aﬃliation of Conseil
rural representatives by profession.
38Ethnic group Total
Wolof Pular Serèr Manding Diola Soninké Mandjag Balante Other
/Lébou /Socé /Sarakholé
Political aﬃliation:
PDS 345 133 76 29 21 2 1 40 647
PS 98 50 17 17 3 1 1 6 193
AFP 99 30 20 8 2 10 169
URD 18 74 1 1 2 96
LD/MPT 15 6 3 1 1 1 27
Independent 14 1 2 3 20
AJ/PADS 227 14 3 1 9









Total 606 307 127 60 31 4 4 2 68 1,209
Table 8: Political aﬃliation of Conseil rural representatives by ethnic group.
39Member of: Member of: Member of:
PS AFP URD PS AFP URD PS AFP URD
Estimator Multinomial logit Multinomial logit Multinomial logit











































































































































































































































































































Pseudo−R2 0.13 0.21 0.16
Table 9: Multinomial logit estimations of the determinants of membership in the four big parties (PDS,
PS, AFP, URD) by members of the four largest ethnic groups (Wolof/Lébou, Pular, Serèr, Mand-
ing/Socé): excluded party is PDS (standard errors in parentheses); 963 representatives from 633 villages
























Table 10: Eﬀective number of parties, villages, ethnic groups and professions (standard deviations in
parentheses), for the Conseil rural and the corresponding CCG.
40Dependent variable Representative is CCG
commission president
Estimator CCG Village of CCG Village of























































































Penrose index of village −0.049
(0.035)
Shapley-Shubik index of village −0.096
(0.038)






























Ethnic group dummies: p−value 0.342 0.236 0.334 0.252
Profession dummies: p−value 0.725 0.715 0.794 0.697
Political aﬃliation dummies: p−value 0.366 0.279 0.479 0.150
σ 0.181 0.215 0.244 0.296
R2 0.135 0.408 0.087 0.519
Table 11: The making of a CCG commission president. Linear probability model: dependent variable
equals 1 when member is vice-president of CCG, zero otherwise (standard errors in parentheses); 30 CCGs
(and CCG vice-presidents) and 697 representatives from a total of 314 villages; for joint signiﬁcance tests,
excluded ethnic group is "Wolof/Lébou", excluded political party is "PDS" and excluded profession is
"peasant".
41